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By Daniel Bodansky
Introduction
Since the Kyoto Protocol's entry into
force in 2005, attention has focused
on the question of what to do after
2012, when the Kyoto Protocol's first
commitment period ends. Should the
Kyoto Protocol be extended through
the adoption of a second commitment
period, with a new round of emission
reduction targets for developed
country parties? And, if so, should a
new agreement be adopted under
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)[1],
which addresses the emissions of countries that either are not parties to the
Kyoto Protocol[2] (the United States) or do not have Kyoto emissions targets
(developing countries)? Or should a single new agreement be adopted that
replaces the Kyoto Protocol and is more comprehensive in coverage,
addressing both developed and developing country emissions?
The Copenhagen Conference of the Parties (COP), which met from
December 7-19, 2009, had been intended as the deadline to resolve these
questions about the post-2012 climate regime – a view reflected in the
unofficial slogan for the conference, "seal the deal."[3] The decision by more
than one hundred heads of state or government to attend heightened public
expectations that the Copenhagen Conference would result in a major
breakthrough; and more than 40,000 people registered, making
Copenhagen one of the largest environmental meetings in history. But the
lack of progress in the negotiations in the months leading up to Copenhagen
suggested that hopes for a full-fledged legal agreement were unrealistic. In
the end, the Copenhagen conference resulted only in a political agreement,
the Copenhagen Accord,[4] which was negotiated by the leaders of the
world's major economies, but was not formally adopted by the conference,
leaving its future prospects uncertain.
The Copenhagen Accord
The Copenhagen Accord is a political rather than a legal document,
negotiated by a group of about twenty-five heads of state, heads of
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government, ministers, and other heads of delegations.
Key elements of the Accord include the following:
Long-term vision – The Copenhagen Accord recognizes the need to limit
global temperature increase to no more than 2° Celsius. States were unable
to agree on other methods of defining the regime's long-term objective, for
example, in terms of an upper bound on atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases such as 350 or 450 parts per million (ppm), or a long-term
goal to reduce global emissions by 50% by 2050 (the so-called "50 by 50"
target, which the G-8 has endorsed), or a target date for the peaking of
global emissions. In deference to the small island states, which had pushed
for a 1.5 degree limit on global temperature change, the Copenhagen
Accord provides that the assessment of the Accord by 2015 include
consideration of this stronger target.
Developed country mitigation – Over the past year, general consensus has
emerged that developed countries should undertake economy-wide
emissions reduction targets for the post-2012 period, although countries
have differed about the stringency of these emissions reduction targets, the
base-year from which reduction targets should be measured, and whether
the targets should be defined using international accounting rules (as in
Kyoto) or national legislation (as the U.S. has proposed). The Copenhagen
Accord establishes a bottom-up process that allows each Annex I party to
define its own target level, base year and accounting rules, and to submit its
target in a defined format, for compilation by the UNFCCC Secretariat. Under
the terms of the Accord, Annex I countries "commit to implement" their
targets, individually or jointly, subject to international monitoring, reporting
and verification (MRV).
Developing country mitigation – As with developed country emissions targets,
the Copenhagen Accord establishes a bottom-up process by which
developing countries will submit their mitigation actions in a defined format,
for compilation by the UNFCCC Secretariat. It provides that developing
countries will submit greenhouse gas inventories every two years, that
developing country mitigation actions will be subject to domestic MRV, and
that the results of this domestic MRV will be reported in biennial national
communications, which will be subject to "international consultations and
analysis under clearly defined guidelines." The Copenhagen Accord also
establishes a registry for listing nationally appropriate mitigation actions
(NAMAs) for which international support is sought, and provides that
supported NAMAs will be subject to international MRV in accordance with
COP guidelines.
Financial assistance – In Copenhagen, the discussions about financial
support revolved around the typical issues: how much money, from what
sources, and with what governance arrangements? The Copenhagen Accord
addresses only the first of these issues, leaving the other two for future
resolution. It creates a "collective commitment" for developed countries to
provide "new and additional resources . . . approaching $30 billion" for the
2010-2012 period, balanced between adaptation and mitigation, and sets a
longer-term collective "goal" of mobilizing $100 billion per year by 2020 from
all sources, but links this money to "meaningful mitigation actions and
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transparency on implementation" (para. 8). It also calls for governance of
adaptation funding through equal representation by developing and
developed country parties, but does not establish governance arrangement
for finance more generally. Finally, it calls for the establishment of a
Copenhagen Green Climate Fund (para. 10) as an operating entity of the
UNFCCC's financial mechanism, as well as a High Level Panel to consider
potential sources of revenue to meet the $100 billion per year goal.
Forestry – In the run-up to Copenhagen, the potential to reduce emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation (known as "REDD-plus") received
considerable attention. The principal question has been whether to finance
REDD-plus from public funds or by providing carbon credits. The
Copenhagen Accord calls for the "immediate establishment" of a mechanism
to help mobilize resources for REDD-plus from developed countries and
acknowledges the "need to provide positive incentives," without resolving the
issue of public vs. private support.
Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) – As with the mitigation issue,
the MRV discussions have concerned the level of MRV as well as the
parallelism/differentiation between developed and developing country MRV.
The Copenhagen Accord calls for "rigorous, robust and transparent" MRV of
Annex I emissions reductions and financing, "in accordance with existing and
any further guidelines adopted by the COP." As noted above, supported
NAMAs by developing countries will be subject to international MRV "in
accordance with guidelines adopted by the COP," while so-called
"autonomous" mitigation actions will be verified nationally and reported in
national communications every two years and subject to "international
consultations and analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure
that national sovereignty is respected."
The Future of the Copenhagen Accord
Despite agreement on the Copenhagen Accord by the heads of state or
government of more than twenty-five countries, including all of the major
economies, the conference was unable to "adopt" the Accord due to
objections by a small group of countries, led by Sudan, Venezuela, Bolivia,
and Nicaragua, which refused to join consensus, arguing that the
negotiation of the Copenhagen Accord by a smaller group represented a
"coup d'état" against the United Nations because it bypassed the formal
meetings. After an all-night session, the impasse was ultimately broken
through a decision to "take note of" the Copenhagen Accord, giving it some
status in the UNFCCC process but not as much as approval by the COP.
Those countries that wish to "associate" themselves with the Copenhagen
Accord are to notify the UNFCCC Secretariat for inclusion in the list of
countries at the beginning of the Accord.
As of February 10, 2010, the UNFCCC Secretariat had received submissions
from more than ninety countries, representing more than 80% of global
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, regarding their plans to reduce their
GHG emissions and/or their wish to be "associated" with the Copenhagen
Accord. In many cases, countries providing information on their mitigation
actions have expressly "associated" themselves with the Copenhagen
Accord, but a number of countries - most notably China, India, Brazil, and
South Africa - did not do so expressly.
The Copenhagen Accord asserts that it will be "operational immediately," but
fully operationalizing its terms will require further acts – for example, the
spelling out of the guidelines for international consultation and analysis of
developing country mitigation actions, and the establishment of the various
bodies envisioned in the Accord (a High Level Panel to study potential
sources of revenue, the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, and a new
Technology Mechanism). Ordinarily, this work would be carried out by the
COP. But if some countries continue to block consensus in the COP, as
occurred in Copenhagen, then this elaboration of the Copenhagen Accord
might need to be done by the "associators" group.
Conclusion
Although the Copenhagen Accord has been criticized by some as
inadequate, it represents a potentially significant breakthrough. True, the
emission reduction pledges announced thus far do not put the world on a
pathway to limiting climate change to 2° C, the ostensible long-term goal of
the Accord.[5] But the participating states did agree to list their national
actions internationally and to subject their actions to some form of
international scrutiny, even when their actions do not receive any
international support. Plus, the Accord articulates a quantified long-term goal
for the first time (no more than 2° C temperature increase) and puts
significant new funds on the table, both for the short and medium terms.
As a political necessity, the Copenhagen Accord continues to reflect the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities, but in a very different manner than in Kyoto. Developed
countries committed to implement economy-wide emission reduction
"targets," subject to international MRV, while developing country "actions"
will be subject to international MRV only if they receive international support
and to national MRV otherwise. Nevertheless, the Copenhagen Accord
reflects an apparent shift by China, India, Brazil, and South Africa, which
begins to break the so-called "firewall" between developed and developing
countries. For the first time, major developing countries have agreed to
reflect their national emission reduction pledges in an international
instrument, to report on their GHG inventories and their mitigation actions in
biennial national communications, and to subject their actions either to MRV
(for internationally supported actions) or "international consultation and
analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national
sovereignty is respected" (for domestically supported actions).
This outcome may seem like a rather modest achievement, but it represents
some measure of "internationalization" of developing country actions. In any
event, if world leaders could not agree to more through direct negotiations,
under an intense international spotlight, it is hard to see why mid-level
negotiators will be able to achieve more anytime soon. As a result, the
Copenhagen Accord may well represent the high-water mark of the climate
change regime for some time to come.
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